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Deputy Director of Astronautics
NASA-Ames Research Center 
Moffett Field, California 94035
ABSTRACT
The Space Shuttle has been heralded as the cost- 
effective replacement for unmanned boosters. Many 
hardware-oriented studies have been performed, 
showing potential cost savings as compared to past 
operations. More recently, studies of management 
approaches and implementation procedures have 
indicated a potential for significant additional 
improvements in effectiveness. To what extent 
are these potential reductions in costs and com­ 
plexities likely to be realized? To reorient the 
internal NASA thinking on hardware and procedures 
is but a small part of the problem. Is it possi­ 
ble for a government service to be efficient and 
self-supporting? These questions must be con­ 
sidered in the broader context of government 
operations as affected by national politics and 
economics and by potential commercial and foreign 
competition.
INTRODUCTION
The outstanding technical successes of both the 
Apollo program and the NASA unmanned space explo­ 
ration program were not without adverse critics, 
even among NASA's satisfied customers: the price 
paid for the success, from the standpoint of the 
payload world, was long lead times, complex ad­ 
ministrative and hardware procedures, and exten­ 
sive overhead (paperwork), all of which detracted 
from the timeliness of the scientific investiga­ 
tions and from the investigators ! sustained 
attention to their primary interests. As long as 
funding was reasonably readily available, however, 
their criticisms tended to remain at the trhealthy 
griping" level, despite their increasing realiza­ 
tion that this support ultimately came at their 
own expense as taxpayers, and hence was in com­ 
petition with other needs.
The end of the Apollo program, however, coincided 
approximately with the beginning of a world-wide 
realization that national economies were in 
trouble. The space shuttle, initially conceived 
as transportation to a space station, became 
simply the replacement for unmanned boosters, and 
its justification shifted to its potential cost 
effectiveness as a launcher and space platform, 
while the space station concept was indefinitely 
postponed. A large number of NASA-sponsored 
studies were performed, analyzing the potential 
cost impact of changed hardware constraints made 
possible by the shuttle (weight, volume, g-loads,
etc.) ; generally, savings ranging from a few per­ 
cent up to a factor of two were shown possible. 
These hardware estimates were readily acceptable, 
as it is easy to compensate for such modest re­ 
ductions by postulating a corresponding increase 
in volume of business. No one need lose his job.
This semi-comfortable posture proved untenable 
almost from the beginning, as it unreal is tically 
assumed a constant total expenditure (unit cost 
times volume of business), and the projected 
reduction in unit complexity was too modest to 
satisfy the aforementioned critics anyway. 
Furthermore, there was always an uneasy feeling 
that there might be more to cost reductions than 
mechanical hardware considerations; claims were 
even being made by some people to the effect that 
the hardware as such accounted but for a small 
fraction of the costs, and that savings by 
factors of 10 to as much as 1000 could be obtained 
by revising management philosophy and implementa­ 
tion procedures, without adversely affecting 
safety and experimental success ratio. Studies 
were never funded to substantiate or disprove 
these claims adequately. The proponents of pro­ 
cedural changes were generally left to pointing 
to other complex space programs which in fact 
have been highly efficient and cost effective 
from the customer's standpoint, such as the USAF 
Space Test Program and NASA's Airborne Science 
Program; and thence to argue endlessly about the 
degree of applicability of this management expe­ 
rience to other programs, in particular to the 
space shuttle. To attempt to resolve this un­ 
certainty quantitatively is to risk losing face 
(pride in past procedures) and losing jobs 
(volume of business is not likely to increase 
that much in the near future).
Meanwhile, and on an increasing scale as the 
underlying uneasiness becomes more explicit, a 
different series of management studies is con­ 
tinuing to be funded under the heading of plan­ 
ning for the shuttle operational era. The 
underlying assumptions are that the NASA mission 
model (some five shuttle launches per month) is 
valid and that the management of such an opera­ 
tion is necessarily immensely complex (otherwise, 
why would we need such multiple and elaborate 
studies to develop management schemes?). The 
results of these studies are thus quite predict­ 
able: they will preserve high, costs (complexity 
and employment) and ignore the possible economic
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inconsistency between that and high volume of 
business. I say "possible" economic inconsist­ 
ency because there is always the "solution" of 
massive subsidies.
It is not the purpose of this paper to quantify, 
defend, or even review the various proposed hard­ 
ware and management schemes. It is clear that 
some measure of cost reduction for space opera­ 
tions is achievable, and the question I wish to 
explore is what are the main impediments to imple­ 
menting lower cost, more efficacious practices, of 
whatever nature. In so doing, I may sometimes 
appear critical of NASA. Such is not ray intent* 
In fact, I question the extent to which the prob­ 
lems can be resolved by NASA, and the aerospace' 
industry independently of resolving some broader 
societal and national issues,
It is also not my purpose to propose solutions, 
and especially not a single,, logical, documented, 
reasonably comfortable and acceptable solution,, 
My biases may be evident, but the format and 
length of this paper preclude such complete 
analyses.
The purpose of this paper is to bring into the 
open certain fundamental issues which underlie the 
general malaise regarding the cost effectiveness 
of the shuttle, and thereby to stimulate thinking 
and discussion. This is but the first step toward 
finding solutions.
The views expressed herein are my own, not neces­ 
sarily those of NASA and/or the Ames Research 
Center management.
IMPEDIMENTS TO COST EFFECTIVENESS
Our approach will be to start with problems 
internal to NASA, as this agency has been the 
world leader and prime focus, and is still the 
largest single driving force in civilian space 
activities. We will quickly be led to the larger 
factors which impede cost effective solutions, as, 
in fact, few of a government agency's problems are 
independent of broader societal problems. We will 
be addressing the difficulties in implementing any 
significant reductions in complexity, not the 
smaller savings which would hardly affect employ­ 
ment.
The most significant internal NASA problem derives 
from the momentum generated by past successes and 
by the intense personnel training which was a part
of it. There is a justified pride in the past 
achievements, and a sincere belief that the pro­ 
cedures employed were' essential. Since generally 
the same leadership and work force are now 
approaching space shuttle operations and payloads, 
it is not surprising that the transferability of 
the experience should go unquestioned, The point 
is not whether this experience is,, in 'fact, 
'uniquely transferable,, or whether equally valid, 
though vastly different experience exists in 
other programs, both domestic and foreign* The 
point is that the fomer is psychologically
acceptable, the latter is not; the former tends to 
be accepted prima facie, the latter to be summa­ 
rily rejected; and the largest manpower and fiscal 
resources are concentrated in the former camp 
(obviously, the proponents and users of simpler 
methods never had a requirement for so much larger 
resources). The initial problem, then, is to 
open people T s minds to the fact that significant 
reductions in complexity are conceivable and 
should be seriously investigated, even if the 
outcome might lead to a significant reduction 
in work force.
This education process was, in fact, initiated in 
1970, and a small but persistent and increasingly 
influential internal lobby has developed. Since 
most of the planning resources, however, are 
devoted to devising the future system within the 
more complex frame of reference, detailed opera­ 
tional plans with attending facilities and 
organizational structures are already coming into 
being; we are thus coming close to having to re­ 
verse or abandon a lot of costly recent creation, 
if in fact there is a simpler approach, and the 
longer we wait the more difficult it will be. 
Hence the following developments appear possible: 
(a) means are found to accelerate the impact of 
the low cost lobby and to implement its recom­ 
mendations; (b) competition from other U.S. and 
from foreign sources of launch services will force 
NASA out of the launch services business (an 
advanced R§D role may be retained); (c) the space 
shuttle will not be cost effective, and will 
survive only if heavily subsidized.
The first possibility would require understand­ 
ing and deliberate action by top management. 
Assuming understanding can break through the 
ties to the past (a nontrivial problem), manage­ 
ment must then not only prevent the generation 
of needless structures, but start new organiza­ 
tional structures to handle a simplified space 
transportation and pay load accommodation system. 
There is enough flexibility and turnover to 
infuse these structures with sufficient fresh 
leadership and work force to retrain other exist­ 
ing and needed personnel. The next problem, 
then, is the disposition of the remaining person­ 
nel. Normal attrition is too slow and too un- 
selective of talent and talent mix. And at this 
point we part company with problems that are 
internal to NASA and within its control.
To transfer excess human and physical resources 
to another agency simply shifts the problem to 
another part of the government; the recipient 
agency, for the sake of its own efficiency, 
should (like NASA) start new structures, not 
reshape old ones, and hence hire selectively on 
the open market. To lay off large numbers of 
personnel is, contrary to popular opinion, quite 
straightforward in Civil Service: the unneeded 
positions are simply abolished by executive 
decision. The problem is the effect on local 
employment and business, and the closing of a 
government activity of any size becomes a 
national political struggle. Contractors who 
used to complain about excessive government red
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tape join the fight to protect their contracts, 
appealing politically on the basis of employment 
and claiming that the executive decision was un­ 
sound to begin with: the agency simply doesn't 
understand what it takes to run its own business. 
Labor organizations and the public join the 
pressure groups with equally inconsistent argu­ 
ments : everyone wants both government cost 
efficiency and government support of his ineffi­ 
cient project. Investigating committees are set 
up to study the conflicting claims, pending 
resolution of which all action directed at effi­ 
ciency is stopped, very likely by Court order. 
The process thus becomes as slow as normal attri­ 
tion, and even more wasteful of resources.
The second possibility, competition from other 
sources of launch services, will not force NASA 
into a more cost effective mode, as open and fair 
competition between commercial enterprises and 
government agencies is impossible. Either the 
government agency becomes an independent enter­ 
prise, free to survive or collapse in accordance 
with its degree of commercial competitiveness; or 
it is protected by regulations which hamper and 
distort competition, and is probably subsidized 
as well. A self-supporting government organiza­ 
tion is a contradiction in terms: if the organi­ 
zation is able to adjust its operating mode and 
fees so as to be fully supported by its customers, 
there remains no government role; especially for 
a service still considered nonessential , the 
support of the organization by its customers is 
the only regulation needed for viability, and the 
best proof thereof. Hence, competition would 
force the government out of the launch services 
business, leaving it to concentrate on commer­ 
cially risky advanced R§D, such as space stations 
development.
The third possibility, a subsidized and expensive 
shuttle, can result simply from inertia, as an 
extention of the status quo, or from a conscious 
decision that, for national prestige or public 
good considerations, the shuttle must be govern­ 
ment operated. Domestic competition could be 
regulated or legislated away, while foreign 
competition is more likely to be fought by home 
subsidies; in either case, the point is that the 
shuttle would not be subject to competitive 
pressures. Ihis nonsolution to the cost effec­ 
tiveness problem ignores the possibility that 
U.S. industry might do an equally creditable job, 
if motivated by profit and not limited by govern­ 
ment regulations; and that greater good and pres­ 
tige might accrue to the U.S. through this 
demonstration of democracy and freedom at work 
than through the continuance of an operation in 
a mode which no longer has the backing of even 
its own customers, precisely because of its 
complexity and cost to the taxpayers.
Can industrial concerns in fact compete success­ 
fully if foreign launch services are government 
operated or subsidized? The affirmative has been 
seriously suggested as feasible, partly because 
foreign nation economies are generally in as much 
or more trouble as ours, and partly because a
powerful mechanism, the multinational corporation, 
would probably be brought into play. Our purpose 
here, however, is not to review the validity of 
proposed solutions, but to surface basic problems 
not otherwise sufficiently discussed. The prob­ 
lems which are the point of this discussion are 
as follows.
Just as NASA has difficulty studying alternatives 
proposed by its low cost lobby,-the country seems 
to have difficulty considering seriously alterna­ 
tives to increasing government roles, despite 
past and current negative experiences with the 
effects of massive nationalization of businesses. 
Assuming one could get support at high enough 
levels, the problem of retrenchment would still 
have to be faced: multinational corporations are 
a potential threat to nationalistic governments 
in that they are difficult (almost impossible) to 
tax and control fully (which helps make them 
commercially effective and powerful); and in that 
they may also be a more powerful means to inter­ 
national ties and cooperation than political 
treaties (the spread of multinational enterprises 
could make war unthinkable and nationalistic 
governments obsolete). Most of the world 1 s 
population is not ready for such retrenchment 
from nationalism, so that, if in fact there is 
a viable commercial potential in a multinational 
launch services corporation, it will have to be 
attempted in spite of various governments T 
opposition.
ASSUMPTIONS, ANALOGIES, AND NONSOLUTIONS
Even when stating problems rather than substanti­ 
ating solutions one makes certain assumptions 
which should be explicitly examined. In particu­ 
lar, the existence of our problems assumes that: 
(1) space travel, exploration and utilization are 
desired by the people; (2) we still have and 
believe in a democracy in which people's desires 
count; and (3) we believe that quality of life is 
strongly dependent on individual freedom (and 
hence responsibility) , so that each and every 
limitation imposed by government must be justi­ 
fied in a hard way.
The current apparent low popularity of space pro­ 
grams is only an expression of immediate priori­ 
ties in a physical and economic environment which 
has deteriorated drastically in recent years; 
such priorities should be respected, but they do 
not mean total abandonment of space programs. 
Fundamentally, space travel (physical and meta­ 
physical) has been a preoccupation and dream of 
mankind throughout history, and this dream is 
perhaps more alive and widespread today than ever 
before (witness the persistent popularity of 
Jules Verne, Buck Rogers, Star Trek, science 
fiction in general, and especially the way in 
which the early Apollo program fired up nearly 
the entire world's enthusiasm). Furthermore, 
the commercial interest in space applications 
(particularly communications, but also navigation, 
meteorology, materials processing, and earth 
resources management) shows that the products
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are saleable to the public. These then, are the 
fundamental justifications of space programs: 
they are a step to the fulfillment of one of 
man's dreams, and they even have some immediate 
and recognizable practical benefits. Other spin- 
offs, technological, intellectual and political, 
are equally valid but do not have public under­ 
standing and backing.
Whether we still have (and believe in) democracy 
and individualism is not as easily answerable in 
the affirmative. Historical evidence indicates 
that these values tend to disappear and govern­ 
ments tend to collapse or become dictatorial 
whenever government spending (or taxes, to this 
accuracy) exceeds about 25 percent of national 
income; the current U.S. figure is around 40 per­ 
cent. The apparent mechanism for this phenomenon 
also explains the impreciseness of the figures. 
It seems that at a level of 15 to 25 percent of 
income, government becomes powerful enough, 
coercively and economically, so that it becomes 
worthwhile for organizations (both labor and 
management) and individuals to devote significant 
resources to lobbying (legislation and rulings) 
and to devising and implementing legal tax avoid­ 
ance transactions. These activities detract 
talent, creativeness and other resources from the 
production of consumer goods and services, but are 
nevertheless reflected in, and thus distort cal­ 
culations of gross national product (goods and 
services) and national income (wages, salaries 
and profits). This overhead and its regulation 
are also reflected in higher consumer prices and 
increased government spending (and taxes), which 
further stimulates the overhead transactions.
Equally importantly, free bargaining and competi­ 
tion are given up, in this process, in exchange 
for government protective regulation, legislation, 
and subsidies. To ask for a competitive (cost 
effective) launch services organization (private 
or government), within a high overhead, highly 
regulated and economically distorted environment 
is probably inconsistent and unrealistic.
Recent (January 1976) news stories (Wall Street 
Journal and local papers) concerning the U.S. 
Postal Service bring out an additional consider­ 
ation, particularly important because, unlike 
launch services, postal services are of direct 
concern to nearly the entire population. Briefly, 
this organization, with established and guaran­ 
teed locations and routes, free from competitive 
worries and subsidized by nearly $1 billion per 
year, neither provides the desired service nor is 
able to remain solvent. Furthermore, proposals 
to allow private concerns to compete are report­ 
edly being rejected because they might drive the 
Postal Service out of business.
A government-control led organization cannot charge 
what the required services really cost (and still 
generate enough volume to be profitable) because 
both the public and the special interests have 
been trained to expect unrealistically low prices 
for government services. The point is perhaps 
made clearer by looking at another example, U.S.
retail gasoline prices, which are two to three 
times lower than those in most other industrial­ 
ized nations. People can be trained to accept 
very broad ranges of price levels, even perhaps 
including the true costs of goods and services, 
depending on the degree of government involvement.
The problem, then, is distorted public expecta­ 
tions, made possible by ignoring the fundamental 
law that one can T t create something out of noth­ 
ing. The artificially low prices and the large 
unproductive overhead and subsidies must be sup­ 
ported by the productive sector (which is dwin­ 
dling because of the overhead).
THE KEY PROBLEM AND A RAY OF HOPE
Briefly stated, the key factor in the proposed 
methods for truly significant cost reductions is 
delegation of responsibility. It is assumed that 
a competent manager is willing to take the respon­ 
sibility for the safety and operational success 
of his mission; that the customer (payload owner) 
is genuinely interested in the proper functioning 
of his payload; and that both can talk freely to 
each other and to such other parties as are 
operationally essential, thus reaching direct 
agreements and decisions on these safety and 
other operational matters. This individual 
responsibility is the basic mechanism for mini­ 
mizing committees, paperwork, delays (diversions 
of efforts to nonproductive areas).
Briefly stated, the underlying common thread in 
the problems outlined in this paper is the un­ 
willingness to assume responsibility and face 
hard decisions. Individuals, the public collec­ 
tively, labor and management, all expect the 
Government to solve their problems for them. We 
have developed a paternalistic society in which 
all look to Daddy for a handout; he owes us a 
living just because we are alive, regardless of 
what we produce in return, and we are not even 
mature enough to ask how large the bill is and 
who is supposed to pay it.
Briefly stated, the key problem is that these two 
positions are incompatible: collectivism de­ 
stroys the incentives for individual responsi­ 
bility. Whether the trend is toward more collec­ 
tivism or toward responsibility, the evidence 
suggests that the human race will not reach 
maturity in time for the first shuttle launch.
The ray of hope, then, is that there are never­ 
theless enough responsible individuals to speak 
out and lead the way, at whatever personal risks. 
The complexity of the total problem need not 
prevent an aggressive though stepwise start. 
There is, in fact, continuing progress in this 
direction.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Some fundamental problems in the path to cost 
effective space operations have been identified
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in the hope of generating open discussion of the 
issues involved. It is hoped that the neces­ 
sarily broad-brush approach of this length-limited 
paper will not detract from its purpose. We can 
only find solutions if we are willing to think 
about the issues.
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